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-Preschoolers trust a sincere informant over a joker when learning novel labels. 
-Preschoolers consider intentions to joke when learning information.  
-Preschoolers’ trust based on current rather than initial intentions. 
-Preschoolers consider the temporal dimension of intentions to some extent 
  





This research demonstrates preschoolers (1) avoid trusting informants with humorous 
intentions when learning novel information, and (2) flexibly consider current rather than 
initial intentions when determining whom to trust. In Study 1 (N = 61) 3- and 4-year-olds 
based their trust on intentions or intentional cues alone, trusting a sincere informant over a 
joker, even when no prior accuracy or inaccuracy was displayed. In Study 2 (N = 32) 3- and 
4-year-olds flexibly based their trust on the informants’ current, rather than initial, intentions 
or intentional cues. Children trusted a sincere informant, who originally joked, over a joker, 
who was originally sincere. In Study 3 (N = 89), 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds tracked changing 
intentions, and not just intentional cues, in determining whom to trust. Children trusted an 
informant who joked during training trials, but was sincere during test trials, over an 
informant who was ignorant during training trials, and sincere during test trials. However, if 
the ignorant informant became knowledgeable, and the joker continued to joke, the pattern 
reversed. This is the first study to show that preschoolers consider intentions to joke when 
learning information. This is also the first study to show that preschoolers do not see trust as 
stable, but see it as a function of changing intentions. 
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Humor and Preschoolers’ Trust: Sensitivity to Changing Intentions 
Humans acquire a large amount of information without directly experiencing the 
empirical evidence associated with it (e.g., Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010). Without 
this ability, we could not learn about history, religion, or countries and cultures not yet 
experienced (e.g., Harris, 2012; Harris & Koenig, 2006). A large body of research suggests 
children do not blindly trust just anyone; children consider whom to trust (e.g., Clément, 
Koenig & Harris, 2004; Corriveau, Meints, & Harris, 2009; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). However, in a world where intentions change over time 
(e.g., Cohen & Levesque, 1990), an important question is whether children trust individuals 
on some occasions but not others (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Robinson, Butterfill, & 
Nurmsoo, 2011; Robinson & Nurmsoo, 2009; Scofield & Behrend, 2008; Sobel & Corriveau, 
2010; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Specifically, do children trust informants when they 
intend to give correct information, but not when they intend to give incorrect information, 
regardless of their initial intentions. Thus, the question becomes not just whom to trust but 
also when to trust a given person. In the current paper, we sought to determine whether 
children (1) know not to trust someone who intends to joke, and (2) consider current 
intentions, not initial intentions, when deciding whom to trust. 
Preschoolers consider past behaviors when deciding whom to trust. For example, 
when learning new words, 4-year-olds trust an informant who previously labeled familiar 
objects correctly over an informant who labeled them incorrectly. Thus, children trust 
accurate over inaccurate informants (e.g., Clément, et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). 
Four-year-olds also mistrust informants who were previously sometimes inaccurate rather 
than consistently inaccurate (Pasquini, et al., 2007; Corriveau, et al., 2009). Additionally, 
children trust accurate informants regardless of their age, trusting accurate children over 
inaccurate adults (Jaswal & Neely, 2006).  




Children also base their trust on informants’ knowledge. For example, Einav and 
Robinson (2011) showed two puppets correctly labeling objects, with one of the puppets 
doing so on their own, and the other requiring help. When later learning new labels, 4-year-
olds, but not 3-year-olds, trusted the puppet that did not need help.  
Most of the research to date suggests children believe previously accurate or 
knowledgeable informants can be trusted in future, whereas previously inaccurate or ignorant 
informants cannot. However people are not statically trustworthy or untrustworthy, and 
recent research suggests that sometimes children do not statically trust or mistrust the same 
individuals (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009; Robinson, et al., 2011; Robinson & Nurmsoo, 
2009; Scofield & Behrend, 2008; Shafto et al., 2012; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010; 
VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Rather, people are trustworthy at times, but not at others.  
One way in which children might change whom they trust is by considering 
intentions. Intention is an important factor to consider in terms of trust as a critical aspect of 
intention is that it is not a stable mental state. People’s intentions change over time (e.g., 
Cohen & Levesque, 1990; Roy, 2009; van der Hoek, Jamroga, & Wooldridge, 2007). 
According to Cohen and Levesque (1990, p. 214), people “keep (or commit to) intentions, but 
not forever; [they] discharge those intentions believed to have been satisfied.” Thus, people 
can revise or complete their intentions, moving onto new intentions. Therefore people can, 
for example, intend to say the wrong thing in order to joke. However once they are done 
joking they can then intend to say the right thing to communicate or inform others. 
Accordingly, the current intention, rather than the former intention, of an informant should be 
important in deciding whether to trust the informant. 
A computational model suggests children likely base their trust, in part, on intentions 
(Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012). Additionally, from 4 years (but not 3 years) 
children do not trust liars (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). From 3 years, children understand that 




pretending is not a reliable cue for acquiring correct information compared to, for example, 
having direct experience with the relevant information (Koenig, 2012). The current paper 
extends this research by considering a third type of intention to do the wrong thing in the 
context of trust – joking.  
We chose to compare joking and sincerity as joking is a clear example of intentionally 
saying or doing the wrong thing (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, Jutsum, & Gattis, 
2008; Leekam, 1991), thus the audience should not trust the information provided as being 
true. In contrast to liars, jokers want their audience to know about their falsehood, and do not 
expect the audience to believe any part of it (e.g., Leekam, 1991). Thus, people provide cues 
when they joke (e.g., Hoicka, 2016; Hoicka & Butcher, 2015; Hoicka & Gattis, 2012; 
Hoicka, et al., 2008; Mireault, et al., 2012). Additionally, infants appreciate humor in the first 
year (e.g., Addyman & Addyman, 2013; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012; Mireault, et al., 2012; 
Mireault, et al., 2014; Mireault et al., 2015; Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972). Furthermore, virtually 
everyone jokes. For example, all 3-year-olds in a parent survey produced novel jokes (Hoicka 
& Akhtar, 2012). Therefore joking is an ideal way to examine whether preschoolers use 
intent to say the wrong thing as a cue not to learn. 
The literature on humor and learning is varied in its results. For instance, while humor 
in the classroom can increase test scores or perceived cognitive learning in higher education, 
the humor must be related to the content, be positive in nature, and perhaps even be 
conceptual (Bolkan & Goodboy, 2015; Dixon, Willingham, Strano, & Chandler, 1989; 
Kaplan & Pascoe, 1977; Wanzer & Frymier, 1999; Wanzer, Frymier, & Irwin, 2010; Ziv, 
1988). And even when these criteria are fulfilled, sometimes humor decreases test scores 
(Fisher, 1997). Even infants are more likely to learn a new functional action when humor 
accompanies the target action, as long as infants laugh (Esseily, Rat-Fischer, Somogyi, 
O'Regan, & Fagard, 2016). However the focus of prior investigations was to determine 




whether humor increases retention of factual information, and not whether learners know to 
retain factual information and reject non-serious information (i.e., the joke). We do know that 
toddlers learn the joke when the goal is to joke (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 
2008). However, we might expect preschoolers to avoid learning from a joker when the goal 
is to learn factual information, and when a model of that factual information is provided.  
Further questions remain as to whether children’s trust is flexible, and whether they 
track changing intentions. It is not clear from the Mascaro and Sperber (2009) or Koenig 
(2012) studies, nor the developmental literature on intention understanding in general, 
whether and when young children understand that intentions are time-dependent. Thus young 
children may encode intentions in two ways. They may assume that the intention displayed 
by a new person on their first encounter is forever more their intention, such that a person 
would always be considered, for example, sincere (and trustworthy) or, e.g., joking (and not 
trustworthy). A second possibility is that young children have some understanding of the 
time-dependency of intentions, such that they should trust an informant’s latest intention, 
regardless of their initial intention. For instance, trusting an informant when they are sincere, 
even if they previously joked. 
Infants are aware of others’ minds early on. From 5 months, they look longer when an 
actor performs a new goal (reaching for a new object in an old location) compared to when 
the actor performs a new action (reaching for an old object in a new location; Woodward, 
1998). When 3-month-olds play regularly with sticky mittens and toys (which attach with 
Velcro), they learn to infer others’ reaching goals (Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 
2005). By 14 months, infants demonstrate an understanding of intentions by imitating 
intended acts, and avoiding unintentional acts (e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; 
Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff, 1995; Sakkalou & Gattis, 2012). However 
research on early intention understanding focuses on infants’ ability to distinguish intentional 




versus accidental or incidental actions. Thus infants do not have to contrast prior and current 
intentions. The experimenters are always sincere and intending to do the right thing, even if 
they make mistakes.  
In order to consider whether children favor current over past intentions when 
determining whom to trust, it is important to first understand whether children can track 
intention types other than intentions to be sincere. Research shows that 3- to 6-year-olds 
judge someone who intentionally took an object from someone else as mean, compared to 
someone who did so unintentionally (Boseovski, Chiu, & Marcovitch, 2013). However 
another study found that it is not until 10 years that children judge that people would e.g., 
scare others to be mean (Grant & Mills, 2011). From 3 years children distinguish intentions 
to lie or pretend from sincere intentions (e.g., Rakoczy, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004; Siegal & 
Peterson, 1996, 1998). From 25 months, toddlers distinguish intentions to joke from sincere 
intentions, and joke intentional contexts from pretend intentional contexts (Hoicka & Akhtar, 
2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka & Martin, 2016). From 15 months infants are sensitive 
to cues distinguishing sincere intentions from intentions to joke, and intentions to joke and 
pretend (Hoicka, 2016; Hoicka & Butcher, 2015; Hoicka & Wang, 2011).  
Some of these studies were within-subjects, for example, involving both joking and 
mistake (sincere) trials; or pretending and trying (sincere) trials; for each participant (e.g., 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2004). While it is tempting to assume this means 2- 
and 3-year-olds do in fact understand that intentions change over time, it could be argued that 
the children in these studies responded to emotional cues (e.g., laughter vs. frustration) rather 
than intentions or intentional cues themselves (see Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). While other 
studies directly compared sincere and humorous intentions, (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka 
& Wang, 2011; Siegal & Peterson, 1996; 1998), these studies were between-subjects studies, 
or involved different agents lying and being sincere, so children did not need to decide to 




between current and prior intentions. Similarly, children in the Boseovski et al (2013) study 
could have tracked intentions through cues (“Bob is really sad”), and the study was also 
between subjects, not allowing a temporal dimension. One study that might capture this 
temporal dimension to intentions is the Grant and Mills (2011) study, however children only 
discerned mean intentions from 10 years. 
In order to determine whether children (1) understand that one should not trust jokers, 
and (2) flexibly change their trust based on changing intentions, we ran a series of three 
studies. Study 1 sought to ensure that children would trust a sincere, accurate informant over 
an inaccurate joker, i.e., that children understood the task was about learning new labels, not 
making jokes. Study 1 also sought to ensure that children’s trust was based on intentions or 
intentional cues, not just prior accuracy. Study 2 examined whether children’s trust changed 
alongside changing intentions. It pitted a sincere informant who used to joke against a joker 
who used to be sincere to examine whether preschoolers would trust based on current, rather 
than previous, intentions or intentional cues. Study 3 examined whether children tracked 
changes in intentions, not just intentional cues. This study compared a joker and an ignorant 
informant. While upon the participants’ first encounter both were equally inaccurate when 
labeling objects, children could infer that the joker said the wrong labels intentionally (and 
likely had accurate knowledge), while the ignorant informant said them as sincere mistakes 
(and likely had inaccurate knowledge). Thus when both informants were later sincere, 
children would have the opportunity to excuse the original joker’s prior inaccuracies, as she 
would now be both sincere and knowledgeable; but would not be able to excuse the originally 
ignorant informant, who remained sincere, but ignorant. A control condition ensured children 
did not always avoid originally ignorant informants. During test trials, the original joker 
continued to give joking cues, while the originally ignorant informant now gave cues she was 
knowledgeable. Therefore children could excuse the originally ignorant speaker’s prior 




inaccuracies as she would now continue to be sincere, but also now be knowledgeable, while 
they could not excuse the original joker, who remained insincere, even if knowledgeable.  
Study 1 
The Train and Test condition of Study 1 was to some extent a replication of the 
original trust in accuracy studies (Koenig & Harris, 2005) with one main change. As in the 
original experiments involving ignorant informants, we gave a reason for the inaccurate 
informant to mislabel the objects during the familiarization phase making the study more 
ecologically valid and naturalistic (Lucas & Lewis, 2010). However in our study the 
inaccurate informant gave the wrong labels because she was joking (not because she was 
ignorant), and hence intended to say the wrong thing. We ran this study to ensure that 
children would choose the sincere (accurate) informant over the joker. This was important as 
previous research found that when the goal is to joke, 2- and 3-year-olds copy a joker’s 
wrong actions or labels (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). In contrast, in the 
current studies, the goal is to learn new words. Therefore children should instead avoid 
copying a joker’s labels. If children understand that the task is to learn new words, they 
should trust the sincere informant at test trials in this study. However if children 
misunderstand the task to be about learning jokes, or if children simply prefer the joker, this 
would suggest this task could not be used to assess whether preschoolers can track intentions, 
let alone changing intentions. 
As children could theoretically base their trust on accuracy alone in the Test and Train 
condition, the Test Only condition sought to determine whether children could base their trust 
on intention or intentional cues alone. In this condition, children received no information 
whatsoever about in/accuracy, but did receive information about whether the informant 
intended to be sincere or joke based on cues. If children can use intentions or intentional cues 




without relying on accuracy information, children in this condition should trust a sincere 
informant over a joker upon their first encounter with the informants at test trials. 
Method  
Participants. The Train and Test condition had 33 children (16 male; 16 3-year-olds 
(M = 43.5 months, range = 38-47 months); 17 4-year-olds (M = 52.5 months, range = 48-59 
months). The Test Only condition had 28 children (13 male, 15 3-year-olds (M = 42.9 
months, range = 36-47 months); 13 4-year-olds (M = 52.0 months, range = 48-57 months)). 
A further four children were excluded because they did not complete any test trials. All 
children were British. Most children were Caucasian. Parents had a variety of educational 
backgrounds. Participants were recruited through local schools and nurseries, the Edinburgh 
Zoo, the Glasgow Science Centre, and through posters and playgroups.  
Materials. Slideshows were created using Microsoft PowerPoint, and presented on a 
laptop computer. Objects in the familiarization trials included a spoon, bottle, doll, and brush. 
Objects in the action videos included a cookie, cup, scarf, and hat. Objects in the test trials 
included a brown feathery cat toy; red, black and silver DIY object; blue and white dog toy; 
and red and white kitchen utensil. Novel names used for each object in the test trials were 
matched for syllable length (see Table 1). Three female actors, each dressed in one solid 
color (purple, blue, or grey), were in the training and testing videos, along with one object per 
video. Action videos were of the actor in the purple shirt, or the actor in the blue shirt, one 
actor at a time, with one action object at a time. Videos lasted 8-10 seconds each. Each slide 
contained either a picture or a video. Each of the picture slides were photographs of objects 
and/or actors featured in the testing and training videos. Children’s responses were video-
recorded directly onto the laptop computer. 
  






















Design. This was a between-subjects design. In the Train and Test condition, one 
informant consistently joked and one informant was consistently sincere throughout the 
 Joker  Sincere  

































 Novel Labels 
Novel object: 
Brown feathery cat toy 
Red, black and silver DIY object 
Blue and white dog toy 

















familiarization trials, action videos, and test trials. In the Test Only condition, children saw 
only pictures of objects in the training trials (no informants), and no videos of informants 
doing actions. Therefore informants only appear in the test trials, which followed the same 
format as the Train and Test condition. Action videos were included in the Train and Test 
condition to be consistent with Studies 2 and 3 which required action videos. The dependent 
variable was whether children trusted the joker or sincere informant at test trials when 
learning new labels. 
Familiar objects were always presented in the same order across trials; however, the 
order of the novel objects was reversed for half the participants. The actors playing the joker 
and sincere informant, and the order of speaking for the joker and sincere informant were 
counterbalanced. See Table 2 for a summary of the design. 
Procedure 
Familiarization trials. In the Train and Test condition, at the start of the 
familiarization trials children were shown a slide with a photo of the three actors and told, “In 
this game we’re going to look at some different objects. I’ve got these two friends, one in a 
purple top and one in a blue top. They’re going to show you some things and tell you what 
they’re called. So you listen carefully and I’ll ask you about it afterwards, ok.” They were 
then shown a slide with a photo of the first object, a spoon, and told, “Let’s do this one first. 
Watch the video and see what they say.” Children then saw the video of the two informants 
being asked to name the object. The joker laughed, named it incorrectly (duck) using a 
humorous intonation pattern (Hoicka & Gattis, 2012) and said, “I’m being silly, only joking.” 
The sincere informant labeled it correctly using a sincere intonation pattern (Hoicka & Gattis, 
2012) while smiling. After watching the video children were shown a slide with pictures of 
the object and the two informants who had named it and asked, “She called it [e.g., a duck] 




and she called it [e.g., a spoon]. Can you tell me what it’s called?” This continued for the 
remaining three trials. 
 
Table 2 
Informants’ (I1 and I2) intentions and knowledge in familiarization, action, and test trials. I1 
and I2 were counterbalanced. 
 Familiarization Trials Action 
Videos 
Test Trials 
Study 1    
Train & Test I1 = Joke 
I2 = Sincere 
I1 = Joke 
I2 = Sincere 
I1 = Joke 
I2 = Sincere 
Test Only None None I1 = Joke 
I2 = Sincere 
Study 2    
Changing Intentions I1 = Joke 
I2 = Sincere 
I1 = Sincere 
I2 = Joke 
I1 = Sincere 
I2 = Joke 
Study 3    
Changing Intentions 
– Same Knowledge 
I1 = Joke (+2 knowledgeable 
trials) 
I2 = Ignorant (+2 
knowledgeable trials) 
I1 = Sincere 
I2 = Sincere 
I1 = Sincere 
I2 = Sincere 
Same Intentions - 
Changing 
Knowledge 
I1 = Joke (+2 knowledgeable 
trials) 
I2 = Ignorant (+2 
knowledgeable trials) 
None I1 = Joke 
I2 = 
Knowledgeable 




In the Test Only condition, children saw no videos during the familiarization trials. 
Instead, for each of the four objects they were shown a slide with a picture of the familiar 
object, given two names for the object and then asked to name it. For example for the spoon, 
they were asked, “Is this a duck or a spoon?” 
Action videos. In the Test Only condition, no action videos were shown. In the Train 
and Test condition, children were told, “Let’s watch a video of them doing some different 
actions. I wonder what they’re going to do.” Before the joker performed the four actions, she 
said, “I’m going to make some more jokes.” Before the sincere informant performed the four 
actions, she said, “I’m going to do some actions.”  
For each action, each informant said the same sentence before performing an action 
such as, “I’m going to put this hat on.” The sincere informant then did the correct action, and 
the joker did the action incorrectly, e.g., putting the hat under her arm and saying, “I’m being 
silly, I’m only joking” and laughing. This continued for the other three actions (see Table 3). 




Object Sincere Action Humorous Action 
Hat Puts hat on head Puts hat under arm 
Scarf Puts scarf around neck Bunches scarf in a ball and puts it on top of head 
Cookie Eats some of cookie Picks up cookie and puts it to forehead while 
making eating noises 
Drink Drinks from cup Puts cup to elbow and makes drinking noises 
 




Test trials. The experimenter introduced the test trials by saying, “Now we’re going 
to look at some strange objects you won’t have seen before and we won’t know what they’re 
called”. Children were then shown a still image of the informants and told, “My two friends 
are going to help us and they will tell us what they’re called, but one will say the name right 
and one will say it wrong. So listen carefully and we can find out what it’s called.” Children 
then saw a photo of the first novel object.  If children named the object they were told, “It 
looks a bit like that but this is something else. Let’s watch the video and see what it’s called.”  
Children then watched the video where a third actor asked the two informants, “Can you tell 
me what this is called?” In both conditions, the sincere informant smiled and said, e.g., 
“That’s a mogo” with a sincere intonation pattern. The joker said, e.g., “That’s a sepa” with a 
humorous intonation pattern, then, “I’m being silly, only joking” and laughed.  Following the 
video children were shown a slide with a photo of the object and the two informants and told, 
“She called it a sepa and she called it a mogo. Can you tell me what it’s called?” and waited 
for the children’s answer. If children did not answer they were shown the video again and 
asked a second time. If they did not answer again the experimenter moved onto the next trial.  
Results 
We modeled the likelihood of responses using logit mixed effects models with the 
LME4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 2008) in R (R Development Core Team, 2009) as 
the data involved a repeated-measures non-parametric design. See Jaeger (2008) and Hoicka 
and Akhtar (2011) for reasons for using this statistic, and how it is used. For each analysis, 
we first built a base model, which included an intercept, and Participant and Trial as random 
variables. No effects of or interactions with gender or age were found. 
See Figure 1 for the percentage of trials on which children chose the sincere actor’s 
label over the joker’s, by condition. The best model (log-likelihood = -96.95, N = 228) found 
children were significantly more likely to trust the Sincere informant versus the Joker at test 




trials overall (Odd’s Ratio, OR = 10.74, p < .0001). They were also more likely to trust the 
Sincere informant in the Train and Test condition than the Test Only condition (OR = 4.09, p 
= .0003). 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of trials children chose the Sincere informant at test trials in Study 1, by 
condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *p < .05 
 
Within each condition, the best model for the Train and Test condition (log-likelihood 
= -36.38, N = 127) found children were more likely to trust the Sincere informant versus the 
Joker at test trials (OR = 21.67, p < .0001). The best model for the Test Only condition (log-
likelihood = -59.21, N = 101) found children were more likely to trust the Sincere informant 
versus the Joker at test trials (OR = 2.67, p = .0011). 
Discussion 
Both conditions found that 3- and 4-year-olds chose to learn new words from the 
sincere informant versus the joker. Thus children understood the task was about learning, not 
joking. One possibility is that children based their trust on prior accuracy only, as the sincere 
informant was always previously accurate, and the joker was always previously inaccurate, in 



































determining whom to trust based on accuracy alone in the Koenig and Harris (2005) study. 
And indeed, in the Test Only condition, children chose the sincere informant based on 
intentions or intentional cues alone. Instead, it seems that having cues to appropriate 
intentions which explain why the informants labeled objects correctly or incorrectly helped 
the children to better understand the task. In the Koenig and Harris study 3-year-olds were 
able to select the correct informant when cues to ignorance and knowledge were given, 
suggesting context helps 3-year-olds. However if we examine the percentage of responses in 
favor of the accurate and inaccurate speakers for the Koenig and Harris study (Experiment 3: 
68% for 3-year-olds, 70% for 4-year-olds), we see that children were much better at choosing 
the correct informant in the Train and Test condition (91%). Therefore joking intentions may 
have made the task easier than cues to ignorance and knowledge. A second explanation is that 
humor in the learning environment increased children’s positive affect, which in turn 
increased learning overall (Bolkan & Goodboy, 2015; Esseily, et al., 2016; Wanzer, et al., 
2010). However a further possibility is that including the action videos better trained children 
to identify the accurate and inaccurate informants, as these were not included in the original 
Koenig and Harris study. 
The results of the Test Only condition converge with a computational model 
suggesting that trust relies on intention (Shafto, et al., 2012), and evidence that 4-year-olds 
mistrust an informant labeled a “liar” (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). However in the lying 
study, 3-year-olds did not know not to trust a liar, while in the current study 3-year-olds knew 
not to trust a joker, suggesting that younger children better understand intentions behind 
joking than lying. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we sought to examine whether preschoolers know to trust the latest 
intention of an informant, rather than their first intention. This study pitted a joker who 




became sincere over a sincere informant who became a joker. If children’s trust is stable, and 
based only on first encounters, they should trust the previously sincere informant even though 
she jokes at test trials. In contrast, if children’s trust is flexible, such that children consider an 
informant’s current intentions, while ignoring her past intentions, children should trust the 
currently sincere informant who used to joke over the current joker who used to be sincere.   
Method  
Participants. Thirty-two children participated (9 male, 16 3-year-olds (M = 41.1 
months, range = 36-46 months); 16 4-year-olds (M = 52.4 months, range = 49-59 months)), 
A further three children were excluded because they did not complete any test trials. All 
children were British and Caucasian. Parents had a range of education backgrounds. 
Participants were recruited as in Study 1.  
Materials. Same as Study 1. 
Design. In this study one informant joked in the familiarization trials but was sincere 
in the action videos and test trials. The other informant was sincere in the familiarization 
trials but joked in the action videos and test trials. By showing that informants had switched 
intentions in the action videos, we anticipated this would prepare children to recognize their 
new intentions in the test trials. The dependent variable was whether children trusted the 
current joker or the current sincere informant at test trials when learning new labels. See 
Study 1 and Table 2 for counterbalancing and a summary of the design. 
Procedure 
Familiarization Trials. Same as the Train and Test condition in Study 1. 
Action Videos. Same as the Train and Test condition in Study 1. However the 
informant who had joked during the familiarization trials became sincere during the action 
videos and said, “I’m going to stop making jokes.” and then made four sincere actions as in 
Study 1. Similarly, the informant who was sincere in the familiarization trials became 




humorous during the action videos saying, “I’m going to make some jokes.” and then made 
four joke actions as in Study 1. 
Test Trials. Same as Study 1, however the informant who joked during the 
familiarization trials was sincere (just as she was during the action trials). By contrast, the 
informant who was sincere during the familiarization trials joked (just as she had during the 
action trials). 
Results 
Children trusted the Sincere informant over the Joker on 82% percent of trials (CI = 
74%-89%). Three-year-olds trusted the Sincere informant at test trials on 72% of test trials, 
while 4-year-olds trusted the Sincere informant on 90% of test trials. The base model was 
improved by Age, X2(1) = 6.03, p = .0141. The best model (log-likelihood = -49.84, N = 112) 
found 4-year-olds were more likely to trust the Sincere informant versus the Joker at test 
trials than 3-year-olds (OR = 3.62, p = .0179). When 3-year-olds were tested alone, the best 
model (log-likelihood = -31.41, N = 54) found they were more likely to trust the Sincere 
informant versus the Joker at test trials (OR = 2.86, p = .0161). When 4-year-olds were tested 
alone, the best model (log-likelihood = -19.27, N = 58) found they were more likely to trust 
the Sincere informant versus the Joker at test trials (OR = 9.71, p < .0001). There were no 
effects of gender. 
Discussion 
Children trusted the informant who was sincere at time of testing rather than the 
informant was sincere upon the children’s first encounter with the informants. This suggests 
trust is flexible. The first encounter with an informant does not determine children’s trust 
permanently. Rather, if a joker stops joking and becomes sincere, children can start trusting 
the previous joker. Likewise, if a sincere informant stops being sincere and starts joking, 
children can stop trusting the previously sincere informant. 




While Study 2 demonstrates that children are flexible in their trust, there are three 
possible explanations for these results. The first explanation is that children were tracking 
intentions, such that they trusted the informant who was currently sincere, and not joking, 
despite their initial intentions. This would demonstrate that children as young as 3 years do 
not judge an informant’s first intention as their permanent intention. They instead rely on the 
informant’s latest intention to judge their suitability as an informant for novel information.  
A second related possibility is that children did not track intentions per se, but instead 
tracked intentional cues. Therefore children may have trusted the person who gave sincere 
cues, but avoided the person who gave joking cues, without reference to their underlying 
intention. If this is the case, this would still suggest that children track others’ behaviors in 
sophisticated ways, but without necessarily explicitly representing others’ mental states. 
The third possibility is that children were tracking changes in accuracy in a 
sophisticated manner. Certainly children were not basing their trust on the first accuracy of 
each informant. If this was the case, children would have trusted the joker at test trials 
significantly more often than they would have trusted the sincere informant. It is also not the 
case that children judged their trust based on prior proportions of accuracy, regardless of 
domain. If this was the case, children would judge both informants as equally trust-worthy as 
each informant was accurate on four trials and inaccurate on four trials across familiarization 
and action trials. The only possibility is that children trusted the most recent accuracy of an 
informant, understanding that accuracy changes over time. While possible, this seems 
unlikely as 3-year-olds in the Koenig and Harris (2005) study (Experiment 1) did not trust 
accurate informants more than inaccurate informants, despite the fact that in/accuracy was 
relatively straight-forward and unchanging. It seems more likely that children were only able 
to do so because they relied on intentions or intentional cues. 




Unlike Study 1, we found an effect of age in Study 2. One possibility is that 
expressing trust flexibly relies to some extent on cognitive flexibility as changing whom to 
trust involves applying a change of rules. Cognitive flexibility is not fully developed in 3-
year-olds (e.g., Zelazo & Frye, 1998), thus this could explain their relative difficulty on the 
task. This also further supports the notion that children tracked intentions over time, as prior 
intentions may have impacted a small amount on 3-year-olds’ ability to infer or respond to 
current intention. Future research should directly examine how cognitive flexibility affects 
flexibility in trust and understanding changing intentions. 
Study 3 
The goal of Study 3 was to determine whether children understand the underlying 
intentions to joke or be sincere (rather than their corresponding intentional cues only), and 
understand that one’s trust should be guided by current rather than initial intentions. In the 
Changing Intentions –Same Knowledge condition a joker intentionally gave wrong labels for 
familiar objects during the familiarization phase. In contrast an ignorant informant sincerely, 
but unintentionally, gave the wrong labels. During the test phase both informants were 
sincere (with no distinguishing intentional cues). If children understand intentions and their 
changing nature, then they should understand that at test trials, the previously ignorant 
informant has not switched intentions, and so her past inaccuracies should not be excused. 
Rather, children might assume that she is continuously ignorant. In contrast, the previous 
joker has switched intentions, and so now her previous inaccuracies can be excused. Thus the 
joker could now very well be accurate, at least compared to the ignorant informant. Thus 
when having to decide between the two informants, children should infer that the previous 
joker is more likely to give the accurate label than the previously ignorant informant. If 
children are basing their trust on intentional cues only, they should trust both informants 
equally at test trial. 




It was also important to rule out the possibility that the results of the Changing 
Intentions – Same Knowledge condition were due to children never trusting an informant 
who was once ignorant, instead of trusting informants based on their intentions. Therefore in 
the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition, the previous joker continued to joke 
throughout the study, such that she did not change intentions, while the previously ignorant 
informant became knowledgeable, showing a change in ignorance state. Thus the joker’s 
intentions did not change, and so her previous inaccuracy should not be excused. Given that 
the joker is very likely to give inaccurate information, it would be more prudent to trust the 
previously ignorant speaker, who is at least trying to give accurate information.  Additionally, 
children may be aided by the previously ignorant informants’ cues that she is now 
knowledgeable, potentially excusing her prior inaccuracy. 
Since this study involved a more advanced stage of Theory of Mind, that is, 
understanding of others’ knowledge and/or ignorance, we increased the age range to include 
5-year-olds. This is because children generally understand false belief by 4.5 years (Wellman, 
Cross & Watson, 2001), and 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, track ignorance cues when 
deciding whom to trust (Einav & Robinson, 2011) therefore only older children might be able 
to infer intentions and knowledge/ignorance in this task. 
It is interesting to note that the original Koenig and Harris (2005) study defined an 
ignorant informant as someone who gave uncertainty cues and then provided no answer 
during the familiarization phase. In contrast, the current study defines an ignorant informant 
as someone who gives uncertainty cues, and then provides an (uncertain) answer during the 
familiarization phase. It is important to note that both types of informants are considered 
ignorant according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2016) which states that ignorant means, 
“Destitute of knowledge, either in general or with respect to a particular fact or subject; 




unknowing, uninformed, unlearned.” However it is worth considering that young children 
may view these types of ignorant speakers as distinct. 
Method 
Participants. Forty-six children participated in the Changing Intentions – Same 
Knowledge condition (25 male, 17 3-year-olds (M = 41.9 months, range = 38-46 months); 17 
4-year-olds (M = 52.1 months, range = 48-58 months); 12 5-year-olds (M = 65.8 months, 
range = 61-71 months). Forty-three children participated in the Same Intentions - Changing 
Knowledge condition (20 male; 17 3-year-olds (M = 42.5 months, range = 37-47 months); 16 
4-year-olds (M = 52.8 months, range = 48-57 months); 10 5-year-olds (M = 66.4 months, 
range = 61-71 months)). Six other children were excluded because they did not complete any 
test trials. All children were British. Most children were Caucasian. Parents were from a mix 
of educational backgrounds. Participants were recruited as in Study 1.  
Materials. The same as Study 1, except there were an additional two familiarization 
trials involving a car and a pig, each with their own incorrect labels; and additional incorrect 
labels were used for the spoon, doll, and car (see Table 1).  
Design. This was a between-subjects design. For both conditions, one informant was 
ignorant during training whereas the other joked. There were six training trials. The joker 
joked for four trials, and was knowledgeable for two trials. The ignorant informant was 
ignorant for four trials, and knowledgeable for two trials. This was to prepare children to 
recognize that jokers can sometimes be sincere, and ignorant informants can sometimes be 
knowledgeable. Overall each participant saw two trials during which the joker joked and the 
ignorant informant was ignorant, two trials during which the joker joked and the ignorant 
informant was knowledgeable, and two trials during which the joker was knowledgeable and 
the ignorant informant was ignorant. See Table 4 for an example. Familiar objects were 
always presented in the same order across trials; however, the order of the novel objects was 




reversed for half the participants. The actors playing the joker and ignorant informant, and the 
order of speaking for the joker and ignorant informant were counterbalanced. 
 
Table 4 
Example of Training Trials in Study 3. Speaker order was counterbalanced. 
 Joker  Ignorant  






















For the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition, both informants were 
sincere during action and test trials. Action trials were included to show a change of 
intentions in the joker, as in Study 2. For the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge 
condition, there were no action videos. During test trials, the joker continued to joke, whereas 
the ignorant informant showed signs of knowledge. Counterbalancing for the test trials was 
the same as Study 1. The dependent variable was whom children trusted when learning new 
labels – the original joker, or originally ignorant informant. See Table 2 for a summary of the 
design. 
Procedure 
Familiarization Trials. The task proceeded in a similar way as in the Train and Test 
condition of Study 1. The joker gave incorrect labels paired with joking cues for four out of 




six familiarization trials and correct labels paired with knowledge cues for two familiarization 
trials. The ignorant informant gave incorrect labels paired with ignorance cues for four out of 
six familiarization trials and correct labels paired with knowledge cues for two familiarization 
trials. Humorous cues were the same as in Study 1. For ignorance cues, the informant 
shrugged her shoulders and labeled the object incorrectly saying, e.g., “I don’t know, that’s a 
train?” Knowledgeable cues involved displaying their knowledge and labeling an object 
correctly, e.g., “I know this one. That’s a spoon.”  
Action Videos. In the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition only, 
children saw the same action videos as in Study 1. The informant who had joked during the 
familiarization trials said, “I’m going to stop making jokes” before carrying out the four 
sincere actions. The informant who was ignorant during familiarization trials said, “I’m going 
to do some actions.” before carrying out the four sincere actions. 
Test Trials. The test trials were the same as Study 1. For the Changing Intentions – 
Same Knowledge condition, both informants labeled the novel object giving sincere cues, 
where they would smile and say, “That’s a mogo.” or “That’s a sepa.” For the Same 
Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition, the joker gave joking cues as in Study 1. The 
previously ignorant informant became knowledgeable saying, e.g., “I know this one. It’s a 
mogo.”  
Results 
See Figure 2 for the percentage of trials on which children chose the label of the 
original Joker over the originally Ignorant informant, by condition. No effects of or 
interactions with gender or age were found. The best model (log-likelihood = -187.90, N = 
326) found children were significantly more likely to trust the originally Ignorant informant 
versus the original Joker at test trials overall (OR = 1478, p < .0001). They were also more 
likely to trust the originally Ignorant informant over the original Joker in the Same Intentions 




- Changing Knowledge condition compared to the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge 
condition (OR = 6.79, p < .0001). 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of trials children chose the original Joker at test trials in Study 3, by 
condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *p < .05 
 
The best model for the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition (log-
likelihood = -114.60, N = 169) found children were more likely to choose the original Joker 
over the originally Ignorant informant when both were sincere at test trials (OR = 1.41, p = 
.0264).  
The best model for the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition (log-
likelihood = -71.40, N = 157) found children were significantly more likely to trust the 
originally Ignorant informant (now knowledgeable) over the original Joker (still joking) at 
test trials (OR = 7.50, p < .0001). 
Discussion 
Study 3 shows children consider current rather than initial intentions, and use this 
understanding to determine whom to trust. When both informants were sincere during test 
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both informants were equally inaccurate during training trials, accuracy could not be used as 
a cue. Because both informants gave the same sincere cues at test trials, children could not be 
simply responding to current intentional cues. Moreover, children in Studies 1 and 2 did not 
trust the joker, even when no previous training was given, suggesting children do not simply 
prefer jokers. Thus children understood that the joker was no longer joking, and was instead 
now sincere. While she was previously inaccurate, it was because she was intentionally so, 
and so this was excusable when she became sincere. In contrast, the ignorant informant did 
not necessarily change knowledgeability, so her prior inaccuracy was not excusable. 
Another explanation is that children avoided learning from an originally ignorant 
informant. However the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition demonstrates that 
children do not forever mistrust originally ignorant informants. Thus children understood that 
the original joker’s intentions have not changed, and so her previous inaccuracy should not be 
excused. Children are thus more likely to trust the originally ignorant informant because she 
is at least trying to give accurate information, unlike the joker. Additionally, children may 
have understood that the originally ignorant informant’s knowledge has changed, such that 
her previous inaccuracy could be excused. These results thus suggest that children trust the 
original joker in the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition because they 
understand that one should base trust on current rather than initial intentions; not because 
they forever mistrust an ignorant informant. 
Surprisingly we found no effects of or interactions with age. This suggests 3-year-olds 
were just as likely as 5-year-olds to base their trust on current rather than initial intentions, 
and possibly current rather than initial knowledge or ignorance. While 3-year-olds and 
younger 4-year-olds were unlikely to have full false belief understanding, it is possible that 
understanding concepts of knowledge and ignorance are not as complex as understanding 
false belief. Indeed, Koenig and Harris (2005) found 3-year-olds used ignorance to inform 




their trust. Therefore one possibility is that children based their trust on intentions in 
combination with ignorance/knowledge. In the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge 
condition, children may have trusted a sincere informant who used to joke because they 
understood that she was originally intentionally inaccurate, and so could excuse her prior 
inaccuracies when her intentions changed. In contrast, they may have found it more difficult 
to trust the originally ignorant informant because they had no evidence she had ceased to be 
ignorant. In the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition, children may have 
understood that the original joker, who continued to joke, would continue to intentionally say 
the wrong thing. In contrast, they may have understood that the originally ignorant informant 
had become knowledgeable, and continued to intend to say the right thing, making her a 
better person to trust. 
A further, less rich, possibility is that children based their trust on intentions alone. In 
the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition, again, children may have trusted a 
sincere informant who originally joked because they understood that she had previously been 
intentionally inaccurate, and so could excuse her prior inaccuracies when her intentions 
changed. In contrast, they may have found it more difficult to trust the originally ignorant 
informant because they had no reason to excuse her prior inaccuracies since she had always 
intended to be sincere. In the Same Intentions - Changing Knowledge condition, children 
may have understood that the joker, who continued to joke, would continue to intentionally 
say the wrong thing. Therefore, compared to someone who intended to say the right thing, 
even if often inaccurate, the originally ignorant speaker might be a better person to trust. 
General Discussion 
Altogether, these studies tell us preschoolers (1) understand that one should not trust 
jokers when learning novel information, and (2) flexibly change their trust based on changing 
intentions. Thus children do not rely on the first intention of an informant, but rather their 




latest intention, and use that understanding to guide their trust. In Study 1, children trusted an 
informant who was consistently sincere over consistently joking when learning new labels, 
even when they had no prior experience with either informant, and had to base their decision 
on intentional cues only. In Study 2, children trusted an informant who was previously 
joking, but currently sincere, over an information who displayed the opposite pattern. This 
suggests children consider current intentions, or intentional cues, when deciding whom to 
trust, and not their first encounter with a person. In Study 3, children trusted an informant 
who originally joked, but became sincere, over an informant who was originally ignorant and 
sincere, and continued to be sincere. This suggests children consider current intentions, and 
not just intentional cues, when deciding whom to trust. It was not the case that children 
simply avoided anyone who used to be ignorant, as children reversed their pattern of trust 
when the original joker continued to joke, and the originally ignorant informant became 
knowledgeable. 
Humor and Trust 
These studies show that children know not to trust a joker when learning novel 
information. This contrasts with past research showing that toddlers will imitate a joker when 
the purpose of the game is to make a joke (Hoicka & Akthar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). 
However, this research is consistent with recent studies showing that toddlers are less likely 
to attend to, endorse, or enforce joke actions and labels compared to pretend or literal actions 
and labels (Hoicka, 2015; Hoicka & Butcher, 2016; Hoicka & Martin, 2016). Therefore 
young children are flexible in how humorous intentions guide their behavior. They endorse 
jokes when the goal is to joke, but reject jokes when the goal is to learn novel information. 
Further possibilities could explain the difference in results between the current studies 
and past research (Hoicka & Akthar, 2011; Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). One difference is that the 
children in the current study were older (3 and 4 years) than children in previous studies (2 




years). Therefore older children may be more likely to reject novel information from a joker 
than a sincere informant compared to younger children. A second possibility is that the way 
the experiment was run affected the results. Past studies involved toddlers playing directly 
with an experimenter. In the current study, children watched a video, and the experimenter 
was not the one doing the labeling. Therefore perhaps children are more likely to copy a joker 
when the interactions are more direct. However it is not clear why the experimental 
differences would also make toddlers less likely to copy a sincere informant, and make 
preschoolers more likely to do so. Future research should examine these questions.  
This research also converges with a computational model suggesting intentions guide 
trust (Shafto, et al., 2012). Moreover, it converges with evidence that children are less likely 
to trust people who intentionally technically say the wrong thing, including liars and 
pretenders (Koenig, 2012; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Therefore from 3 years, children have 
a sophisticated understanding of how to interpret complex intentions, such as humorous 
intentions, in a learning environment. 
From a general learning point of view, Study 1 may converge with adult literature 
showing that humor in general can increase learning (Bolkan & Goodboy, 2015; Dixon, et al., 
1989; Kaplan & Pascoe, 1977; Wanzer & Frymier, 1999; Wanzer, et al., 2010; Ziv, 1988) in 
that Study 1 showed higher overall learning rates than the original Trust studies (Koenig & 
Harris, 2005). A study directly comparing humorous and non-humorous conditions would be 
necessary to determine whether this is the case. However research on 1-year-olds suggests 
that humor does enhance learning of functional actions (Esseily, et al., 2016), so it may not be 
a great stretch to predict that humor might increase label learning in preschoolers as well. 
Intentions 
This research demonstrates that children do not forever base their trust on an 
informant’s first intention, but instead flexibly base their trust on the informants’ current 




intention, taking time into account. This research thus supports the proposal that intention 
understanding is more complex than simply knowing that someone has acted intentionally. 
For instance, much research considers toddlers’ understanding that people intend to be 
sincere (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998; Gergely, et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1995; Sakkalou & 
Gattis, 2012). However understanding complex intentions, such as intentions to do the wrong 
thing, shows that children consider why, and not just whether, someone would do something 
intentionally. This likely does not occur until 25 months (e.g., Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Rakoczy, et al., 2004; Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998). From a 
philosophical point of view, the question of why may be thought of as inherent to truly 
understanding intention (Anscombe, 1963). The current studies extend this research by 
showing that by preschool age children have an understanding of the time-dependence of 
intentions. However, as we did not test children younger than 3 years old, a question remains 
as to whether younger children would be able to consider intentions as a function of time. 
Future research should explore this possibility. 
One could argue that preschoolers did not really understand intentions in the current 
studies. Perhaps children relied on prior accuracy. While this could help explain the results 
for the Train and Test condition in Study 1, and to some extent, Study 2, children could not 
rely on prior accuracy for the Test Only condition in Study 1, or either condition in Study 3, 
as prior accuracy was equal across informants. Additionally, Koenig and Harris (2005) found 
that 3-year-olds could not base trust on prior accuracy alone, suggesting that accuracy alone 
is unlikely to explain the results even for these conditions. 
It is also arguable that we simply gave children the “answer” by using cues - laughter, 
humorous intonation patterns, and the word “joking”. However we did not give these cues at 
test trials in the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition in Study 3, thus this 
cannot be the full answer. While children did not perform as well in Study 3 as in Studies 1 




and 2, their responses were significantly above chance levels, suggesting they understood the 
intentions rather than the cues alone to some extent. Additionally, for the other conditions 
where these cues were used at testing, it is important to note that these cues are not a direct 
synonym of saying that the information is wrong, and from a child’s point of view, they may 
be difficult to interpret. For instance, Mascaro and Sperber (2009) found that 4-year-olds, but 
not 3-year-olds, mistrusted an informant who was explicitly labeled a liar. Thus giving lexical 
cues to 3-year-olds did not help them infer that the information was false, presumably 
because they did not yet understand either the term or the concept of “liar”. Thus the fact that 
3-year-olds in the Test Only condition of Study 1 correctly interpreted the cues during test 
trials, when no actual accuracy information was available, shows a sophisticated 
achievement. 
A further possibility is that children did not base their trust on changing intentions in 
Study 3, but instead based their trust on changing ignorance or knowledge alone. Thus 
children may have ignored the intentions of the joker and focused on the ignorance or 
knowledge state of the previously ignorant informant. Therefore children may not have 
excused the previously ignorant informant in the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge 
condition because it was not clear that her knowledge had changed. In contrast, they may 
have excused the previously ignorant informant in the Same Intentions – Changing 
Knowledge condition because it was clear her knowledge had changed, based on the 
knowledge cues given. While possible, this interpretation is much richer than an intention-
based interpretation. While children understand infer goals from 5 months (Woodward, 
1998), intentions from 14 months (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998), and intentions to do the 
wrong thing from 25 months (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008), children do not understand ignorance 
until 3 or 4 years (Einav & Robinson, 2011; Koenig & Harris, 2005), nor false beliefs until 
4.5 years (Wellman, et al., 2001). Additionally, given that intentions can be considered by 




nature to be time-dependent, while knowledge may be less time-independent (e.g., 
Anscombe, 1963, Cohen & Levesque, 1990), this suggests it would be more natural for 
children to capture time shifts in intentions rather than knowledge.  
A final possibility is that children combined their understanding of both intentions and 
knowledge/ignorance, relying on the most recently inferable mental states. Analysis based in 
philosophy and artificial intelligence shows that intention is not a stand-alone mental state. 
Rather, to have an intention, one must also have other mental states such as beliefs and 
knowledge (Cohen & Levesque, 1990; van der Hoek, et al., 2007). Thus for children to truly 
understand others’ intentions, they must also understand others’ beliefs or knowledge. In 
Study 3, children may have understood (1) that a joker likely knew the correct labels, but 
intended not to say them, and (2) that an ignorant informant did not know the correct labels, 
but intended to say them. Therefore in the Changing Intentions – Same Knowledge condition, 
children may have been more willing to excuse the previous joker’s past inaccuracy over the 
previously ignorant informant’s past inaccuracy because at test trials the joker likely knew the 
correct labels and now intended to say them, while the ignorant informant still did not know 
the correct labels, but intended to say them. Similarly, in the Same Intentions - Changing 
Knowledge condition, children may have been more willing to excuse the previously ignorant 
informants’ past inaccuracy over the joker’s past inaccuracy because the knowledge cues that 
the previously ignorant informant now gave would suggest that she likely knew the correct 
labels and intended to say them, while the joker still knew the correct labels, but intended not 
to say them. However, it is important to note that this is a richer interpretation than assuming 
children solved the task with intention understanding alone given the developmental 
trajectories of understanding intentions and knowledge. Future research should consider 
whether preschoolers can flexibly track changing ignorance and knowledge alone. 




One more point to consider is how children made sense of the actors’ intentions. One 
possibility could have been to ask children, “Why was she not good at answering questions” 
(Explanation Probe, Koenig & Harris, 2005). However looking at the Koenig and Harris 
study suggests that children at this age are not very good at answering these open-ended 
questions, giving plausible answer such as, “She doesn’t know what they are.” to implausible 
answers such as, “Maybe she was mad at her sister.” with many children giving no answer at 
all (Koenig & Harris, 2005, p.1266). This was despite children in that study being good at 
determining whom to trust. Therefore while we would ideally like to get in depth information 
from preschoolers, they may be limited in their capacity to explain how they make their 
choices. 
Stable Traits 
Much of the research to date portrays children’s trust as involving the attribution of a 
stable trait concerning prior accuracy or knowledge (e.g., Clément, et al., 2004; Corriveau, et 
al., 2009; Einav & Robinson, 2011; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini, et al., 2007). By 
showing that children alter their trust based on changing intentions, this adds to a growing 
body of research showing that children are flexible in their trust (e.g., Nurmsoo & Robinson, 
2009; Robinson, et al., 2011; Robinson & Nurmsoo, 2009; Scofield & Behrend, 2008; Shafto 
et al., 2012; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). In the case of 
intentionally saying the wrong thing, such as joking, it is highly unlikely that someone would 
always joke, even if most people joke at certain times (e.g., Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Thus, 
research into trust should be more broadly defined as when to trust someone, instead of 
whether to trust them. 
Conclusions 
The current studies found that children do not trust a joker when learning novel 
information. Furthermore, the current studies found children’s trust is not solely reliant on 




informants’ past behaviors. Rather, preschoolers consider people’s current, rather than past, 
intentions to determine whom to trust. Although most research on trust focuses on the 
question of whom to trust (e.g., Clément, et al., 2004; Corriveau, et al., 2009; Koenig & 
Harris, 2005; Pasquini, et al., 2007), the current studies further the suggestion that research 
should open up to consider the question of when to trust someone. The current research also 
demonstrates that preschoolers have a complex understanding of intentions. They know to 
consider an informant’s current intention, not their first intention, and they understand the 
reasons behind people’s intentions.   
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